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Abstract 
 
The goal of this paper is to get a better view of the characteristics of coalition governments 
and their effect on foreign policy decision-making. Specifically the relation between 
ideological cohesion in a coalition, leadership and the amount of parties in a coalition and 
foreign policy decision-making is analyzed. This is necessary because there are mixed 
research results and scholars cannot agree on the importance of these variables. Using the 
cases of the Dutch government’s policy position during the EU negotiations about the second 
and third bailout program for Greece in 2012 and 2015, I have found there is no result 
between ideological cohesion and the agency of a government, while research on the amount 
of parties shows the same result. Leadership shows mixed results, but it becomes clear the 
national interest is maybe not always the primary goal and task for government leaders. At the 
same time a leader’s partisan background does not impact the foreign policy position of the 
government. 
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Problem Statement 
 
In Foreign Policy Analysis one way to explain a nation’s foreign policy is to research that 
nation’s national political structure and/or system. Many scholars have looked at how a 
nation’s structure influences foreign policy. At the same time a lot of attention has already 
been paid to the differences between these different structures and many comparative research 
has been done, the specific knowledge of how a system influences foreign policy is not very 
extensive, especially for coalition governments (Oppermann e.a., 2016, p. 2). As Oppermann 
(e.a., 2016, p.2) puts it ‘’Opening up the ‘black box of coalition governance in foreign affairs, 
therefore, promises more finegrained insights into the drivers and characteristics of coalition 
foreign policy’’. The relation between coalition governments and foreign policy is 
increasingly being researched since the late 1990’s. This research has mainly focused on the 
outcome of coalitions’ foreign policy decision-making, while the process of foreign policy 
decision-making has received relatively less attention (Oppermann e.a., 2016, p. 2).  
Note that most of the literature is concerned with conflict and the balance of power; 
either between nations or between coalition parties. However, it is striking that on many of 
these topics scholars are divided in their opinions and conclusions. The evidence of different 
researches is conflictual and does not give cohesive answers. I will expand further on these 
points in the second part of this paper. However, this means the knowledge of coalition 
governments and foreign policy-making is still limited and this article will therefore set out to 
increase the understanding of how different coalition characteristics impact foreign policy 
decision-making, and how these factors relate to each other. Therefore in this research the 
general question is: why and how is a coalition government’s foreign policy position 
influenced and formed by a coalition’s characteristics.  
This article has five sections. I will first review the relevant literature on foreign policy 
and coalition theory, as well as discussing the shortcomings in the literature and of some 
researches. In the second part I will compose a theoretical framework in which I will set out 
several hypotheses, trying to explain the why and what coalition characteristics influence the 
coalition government’s foreign policy position. In the third part I  will discuss my case and 
data selection, before I test my hypotheses using two cases. In the fourth part of this paper I 
will analyze two cases; the policy position of the Dutch cabinets Rutte I during the 
negotiations for the second bailout program for Greece in 2012 and the policy position of 
Rutte II during the negotiations of the third bailout program for Greece in 2015. In the last 
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part of this research, the conclusion and discussion, I will discuss the implications of this 
study on the theory of foreign policy-making and coalition theory in general.  
 
Literature review 
 
Coalition theory is a domestic, structural approach to understanding a phenomenon. In general 
coalition theory tries to understand why, how and with whom parties decide to form a 
coalition, as such; what motivates parties to join/form a specific multiparty cabinet (see for 
example Axelrod 1970; De Swaan, 1973; Leiserson, 1966; Riker, 1962). Coalition 
governments set themselves apart from other government types because of a few distinctive 
characteristics. Hagan e.a. (2001) describe coalition governments as an example of coalition 
decision units. As such, coalition decision units have their own distinctive features and 
characteristics, setting it apart from other types of decision units. In other types of decision 
units a leader or a single group has the ultimate authority in foreign policy-making (like a 
single-party government). But a coalition decision unit is different.  
It is the absence of a leader or single group with ultimate authority that is one of the 
defining features of a coalition government and gives coalition decision units its distinct 
nature, in which decision-making often appears in a fragmented setting (Hagan, 1993; Hagan 
e.a., 2001). This means that no actor in a coalition decision unit, whether it’s a single member 
or a group, has the authority to make and carry out a policy on its own. Every member of the 
coalition can block any proposal and is needed to approve policies. A second defining feature 
is related to the process of decision-making in coalition decision units (Hagan e.a., 2001). 
Every (individual) actor in the coalition is constrained by its constituents. Bargaining in 
coalition decision units takes therefore place in two domestic political arenas; in the coalition 
itself and inside the individual coalition parties. Often this type of decision-making units 
appear in parliamentary democracies, but also regularly  appear in presidential democracies 
and authoritarian regimes (Hagan e.a., 2001). 
In relation to foreign policy decision-making coalition theory became an interesting 
tool for Democratic Peace theorists trying to explain the variation in conflict involvement 
(war or other military conflicts) of different types of (democratic) governments  (Prins & 
Sprecher, 1999, pp. 272-273). Hagan (1993) however argues in parliamentary systems the 
government is less constraint, or as he calls it, coalitions are ‘constraint free’. He and others 
(for example Prins & Sprecher, 1999; Strøm e.a., 2010) argue that in a coalition it is not 
obvious who is accountable and/or responsible for the policy, because monitoring, controlling 
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and blaming a single party is more difficult in a coalition government than in a single-party 
government. Besides coalitions have a concentration of authority in the government (as 
opposed to parliament), and therefore the coalition government should be more independent 
and less constraint. And therefore show more aggressive behavior resulting in more 
participation in armed conflicts. 
However, there are also scholars who argue the opposite; that coalitions are more 
constrained (compared to single-party governments), decreasing their ability to make foreign 
policy. Maoz & Russett (1993, p. 626) support this notion and argue that coalition 
governments and minority cabinets are far more constrained. One argument is that in coalition 
government ‘’conflicts over policy objectives are not resolved prior to government 
formation’’ (Prins & Sprecher, 1999, p. 274). Another argument is that coalition governments 
and minority cabinets have to secure support for a policy from multiple (domestic) sources, 
including support from parliament and therefore a coalition government would be more 
constrained than a government in a presidential system, or a single-party government. It is 
therefore more difficult for a coalition government to make foreign policy and to commit to a 
specific foreign policy.  
However, there seems little empirical support for this argument (Prins & Sprecher, 
1999, p. 273). Yet derived from this statement is the argument that more parties in a 
government or coalition leads to more constraints and therefore instability, a higher chance of 
conflict and less agency of the government. Additionally, it is argued that minority 
governments should have the least ability in developing a sustainable, coherent and stable 
foreign policy, since a minority government has the least amount of freedom to make 
decisions because its dependency on support of opposition parties in parliament (Prins & 
Sprecher, 1999 p. 274).  
It is in extension of this debate in which Kaarbo (1996; 2003; 2008) did her research 
on coalition politics and foreign policy that would result in the extremity hypothesis. This 
hypothesis states that coalition governments are more likely to show extreme foreign policy 
behavior than single-party governments (Kaarbo & Beasley, 2008, p. 70). More extreme 
could either mean higher levels of cooperation or conflict. This would explain the mixed 
results of earlier studies that found that coalitions are either more peaceful or more aggressive 
than other government types. In her research Kaarbo (2008) suggested that the social 
psychological dynamics of small groups in a coalition government might be an explanation 
for the influence of junior coalition parties on foreign policy, and the hypothesis. However, 
this research of Kaarbo has been since the center of researches that came afterwards and that 
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did not unanimously supported Kaarbo’s results and conclusions and often had their remarks 
and additives to the extremity hypothesis (most notable Clare, 2010; Curini & Ceron, 2012; 
Oktay; 2014; Coticchia & Davidson, 2016; Beasley & Kaarbo; 2016).  
One of the discussions in these researches is about the role of ideological (diversity) in 
a coalition. Oktay (2014) describes it as follows: ‘’Clearly, there is no consensus on the 
relationship between government composition and foreign policy behavior. The existing 
debate remains weak as it disregards two key characteristics that differentiate single-party 
governments and coalitions: types of coalitions and the degree of ideological differences 
inside them’’. This last point of Oktay is very important, as there is a distinction in the 
literature. Many studies do not take (party)ideology or ideological cohesion into account as a 
variable in their equation (For example Coticchia & Davidson, 2016; Kaarbo & Beasley, 
2008; Oppermann & Brummer, 2013; Prins & Sprecher, 1999), while others argue ideology is 
from existential importance in explaining the foreign policy of coalitions (See Bolleyer 2007, 
Clare, 2010; Palmer e.a., 2004). Oktay (2014) concludes therefore that ‘’focusing on whether 
the government includes one or many parties is not enough to explain its commitment 
intensity’’, which is obvious in conflict with the aforementioned extremity hypothesis. 
Among the research on coalitions and foreign policy there has also been attention for 
the influence of leadership and party influence on the ministry of foreign affairs. In a study of 
Kaarbo (1996) it was found that the locus of decision making is important in explaining the 
influence of junior parties (and therefore an explanation for more peaceful or conflictual 
behavior (although the extremity hypothesis replaced this with more extreme behavior)). It 
was argued that the locus of authority could resident in the cabinet as a whole, the prime-
minister’s office or the individual ministries (Kaarbo, 1996, p. 510). Additionally, Oppermann 
e.a. (2016) argue that the party controlling the ministry of foreign affairs has a privileged role 
that allows the party to exercise more influence on foreign policy compared to the other 
coalition party/parties, since it shows that party has a particular interest in foreign affairs, 
controls the bureaucracy and has the initiative with new policies and developing them. The 
party controlling the foreign ministry has both the will and means to take a leading role and 
therefore increase its influence.  
Besides, Oppermann e.a. (2016) argue that the type of coalition arrangement (either 
ministerial or cabinet governance) and which coalition partner controls the ministry of foreign 
affairs (the senior party or one of the junior parties) influences a coalition’s foreign policy 
decision-making, which leads to different scenario’s in which a coalition party’s influence is 
determined. In the case of a setting in which the cabinet decides the policy (i.e. the locus of 
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authority is the cabinet) it is argued the influence of the junior party controlling the ministry 
of foreign affairs is limited. Although the coalition’s foreign policy in this case is 
‘’particularly susceptible to deadlock’’ (Oppermann e.a., 2016, p. 7). Especially if the office 
of prime-minister and the ministry of foreign affairs are held by different coalition parties 
there is a greater scope for conflict among coalition parties about foreign policy-decision 
making, since the status of a junior coalition party in an inner coalition meeting is more equal 
than outside of such meetings (Kaarbo, 1996, pp. 518-519). However, there is not much 
empirical data available on this matter, and therefore there is no data backing up the argument 
of Oppermann. To conclude, there is a gap in the literature regarding the relationship between 
leadership, partisan influence on the ministry under their control and foreign policy decision-
making. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Here I will first discuss the influence of the ideology of individual parties and the ideological 
composition of a coalition government as a whole on the government’s foreign policy position 
and foreign policy decision-making. Ideology is an important variable in explaining a 
government’s foreign policy position because ideology often explains an actor’s motives and 
actions (Hermann, 1980, p. 10). However, a coalition is not a homogenous entity since a 
coalition constitutes several parties. Therefore it is not easy to determine the government’s 
ideological position, because the individual parties often do not share the same ideology or 
ideas about a policy issue and policy-making (Clare, 2010, p. 967). When the individual 
parties have different ideological positions on the topic of foreign policy they probably will 
negotiate about the specific issue, maybe during the formation of the coalition, or maybe only 
after the specific policy issue becomes relevant and/or problematic. 
It is useful to make a distinction between ideological cohesive coalitions and 
ideological fractionalized coalitions. In the case of an ideological cohesive coalition treating a 
coalition as a homogenous entity should not be problematic, because internal ideological 
cohesion in a coalition or cabinet increases the durability of a coalition, while at the same time 
it reduces the chances of conflict over a foreign policy issue (Clare, 20120, pp. 967-970). 
Looking at a coalition with parties in the coalition are not ideological cohesive regarding a 
policy issue it is not so easy to say what the resulting foreign policy position of the 
government will be. There will be negotiations and maybe even a severe conflict about the 
foreign policy position, especially when the specific policy issue at stake has not been 
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discussed beforehand during the formation of the coalition. Besides, ideological 
fractionalization limits the range of policy options, affects a coalition’s internal vulnerability 
and  at the same time increases the possibility of conflicts between coalition parties (Clare, 
2010, pp. 967-969). Now, what determines the outcome of the negotiations between coalition 
parties? Based on literature, there seem to be four aspects of importance determining the 
outcome of these negotiations. 
First, the possibility of side-payments as a form of an equivalent compensation for 
concessions on a specific policy (Hagan e.a., 2001, pp. 186-187; Friman, 1993, p. 388). 
Conflict is avoided and a solution is usually reached when an issue can be traded for another 
policy. However, both policies have to be of relatively the same salience, otherwise one of the 
parties will feel like it makes a lesser trade and will not agree with the side-payment. The 
second aspect concerns the internal cohesion of the coalition parties. When one of the parties 
is internally divided it will severely harm that party’s ability to influence negotiations and 
foreign policy-making. That party will not be able to mobilize its resources and support, 
resulting in a decrease of the party’s leverage during negotiations and lesser strategy options 
during negotiations (Kaarbo & Lantis, 2003, pp. 217-218).  
Third, the relative salience of the policy at stake is of importance as well. A party will 
not make a big deal of some minor disagreement or unimportant issue, but when the 
disagreement clashes with a party’s fundamental convictions a deadlock and/or hijacking the 
policy at stake becomes an option. Or even worse: the dissolvement of the coalition becomes 
a possibility when a policy clashes with a party’s fundamental convictions (Coticchia & 
Davidson, 2013, pp. 5-6). A party will leave the coalition in that case because it risks 
alienating its internal coherence and/or electoral base and potentially a big electoral lose in the 
next elections. The last and fourth aspect influencing the outcome of policy negotiations is a 
party’s ability to form an alternative coalition. If there is no alternative coalition possible, 
eventually after new elections, the party would lose its (presumed) influential position as a 
coalition partner, something many rather not do, and therefore their leverage in negotiations is 
reduced (Kaarbo & Lantis, 2003, p. 207; Bolleyer, 2007, p. 122). It is when these four aspects 
positively influences a party’s ability to influence foreign policy decision-making that a 
government’s foreign policy position is unstable and inconsistent in an ideological 
fractionized coalition. To conclude, I hypothesize that: 
 
H1) The closer the parties are ideological the more stable and consistent the 
 government’s foreign policy. 
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Now moving on to the second party of the theoretical framework I will discuss the influence 
of leadership on the foreign policy position of a government. Leadership styles affect, both 
direct and indirect, foreign policy as they can for example shape the foreign policy decision-
making process, or, of course are allowed to make decisions on their own authority (Kaarbo, 
1997, pp. 553-554). It is important to note that a there are conditions under which an 
individual is more likely to affect foreign policy. For example when ‘’1) the environment 
admits of restructuring; 2) the individual is centrally or strategically located in the 
environment; and 3) the individual is skillful or has other types of personal strength’’ 
(Kaarbo, 1997, p. 560). While this is certainly important, the theoretical argument here is 
concerned with the question when personality variability matters, and not when an individual 
person can exercise influence. To conclude, I want to know which individual characteristics 
are relevant when individual characteristics can make a difference (Kaarbo, 1997, p. 560). 
There are a few elements relevant to determine a leader’s leadership style although I 
will only take one into account here (because of the limited scope of this research). 
Researching prime-ministers leadership styles Kaarbo (1997; Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998) finds 
evidence that an important factor explaining a prime-minister leadership style and therefore 
foreign policy is the task orientation of the leader. The task orientation of the leader refers to 
what his or her perceived goal or task is. The task orientation of a leader ‘’depends on 
whether the prime minister stresses … the policy goal and focuses discussion on the issue, or 
whether the prime minister stresses relations, either interpersonal or political’’(Kaarbo, 1997, 
p. 565). So to determine this variable it is necessary to determine whether the national policy 
goal is the most important or whether the international policy goal and the relation with other 
countries is more important and reaching an agreement is more important.  
However, I think another possibility in a coalition government is that the leader in the 
negotiations on the international level tries to champions his or her own party’s interest. So 
actually there are three possible options here in my opinion; does the leader choose for his or 
her partisan interest, national interest or the interest of and relation with his/her negotiation 
partners. When the goal is one’s own national foreign policy position, this will probably lead 
to a more conflictual and harder policy position during negotiations with other actors/nations, 
as the leader is very much commitment to his/her national policy goal (Kaarbo, 1997, pp. 563-
577). Meanwhile an approached focused on the relation with and interest of international 
partners will probably lead to a less confrontational policy, relatively easier negotiations and 
it will be more likely a compromise is reached earlier than when one’s partisan or national 
interest is pursuit. I suspect that when a leader decides to champion his party’s interests it will 
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have the same effect as focusing on the national policy goal/position, meaning that the nation 
has a more confrontational approach on the international stage. Therefore the second 
hypothesis will argue that;  
 
H2) A task orientation of a leader that is focused on the national and/or his/her 
 party’s policy position will lead to a more confrontational policy position 
 
Now, moving on to the third hypothesis that is concerned with the influence of the amount of 
parties in a coalition on the government’s foreign policy position. It is often argued that 
coalition governments have a harder time in any kind policy decision-making, compared to 
single party governments (Prins & Sprecher, 1999, p. 274). It is assumed that constraints 
increase with even more parties represented in a coalition government. A first constraint is the 
policy decision-making process, as foreign policy decisions are politically more difficult to 
make, because political support has to be secured from multiple sources; all individual 
coalition parties have a veto and unanimity is necessary to carry out a policy (Hagan e.a., 
2001, pp. 177-181).  
Especially when a policy is not agreed upon in the coalition agreement drawn up 
during the formation of the government, the negotiations about the policy are expected to be 
very difficult, because usually ‘’conflicts over policy objects are not resolved prior to 
government formation’’(Prins & Sprecher, 1999, p. 274). The negotiations about the policy 
therefore also leads to an increased chance of conflict between the coalition parties (Prins & 
Sprecher, 1999, pp. 274-275). Other control mechanisms, or constraints are for example 
divided portfolios (i.e. labor/authority division between a prime-minister and a minister and/or 
the minister and a junior minister, who belong to a different coalition party), parliamentary 
committees chaired by one of the other coalition parties that’s not holding the foreign ministry 
to control and to keep the foreign ministry in check, and ‘’high-level coalition committees and 
cross-departmental policy-making bodies in which all coalition partners are equally 
represented’’ (Oppermann e.a. 2016, p. 5). 
Besides, the negotiations will take more time as (more) parties with different policy 
positions have to agree on a common foreign policy position, while having the ability to veto 
the foreign policy decision.  Additionally, because of the unanimity principle of coalition 
governments the instability of a coalition government is increased and therefore it is 
reasonable to assume more parties in a coalition will supposedly lead to a less stable and 
decisive coalition (Kaarbo & Beasley, 2008, p. 69). Therefore I hypothesize that; 
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H3) More parties in a coalition will lead to more constraints and therefore less agency 
 of the government.  
 
Research method 
 
In order to answer the general research question, ‘’why and how is a coalition government’s 
foreign policy position influenced and formed by a coalition’s characteristics’’, a qualitative, 
comparative case study was performed. One important advantage of this approach, and the 
reason to choose this approach, is that qualitative research and case study methods are 
especially well suited to study complex phenomena, especially, when there is conflicting 
empirical data (Bennett & Elman, 2007, p. 171). This applies to this research and research 
field, as the existing research find conflicting results and relations between the dependent 
variable, a nation’s foreign policy decision-making/position, and independent variables (in 
this research: ideology, leadership and the amount of parties in a coalition). It is important to 
keep in mind that an often pronounced liability of this method is that the research could 
become an unconnected, atheoretical, and idiographic study (Bennett & Elman, 2007, p. 172). 
Therefore, to avoid this, in the theoretical framework and during this research hypotheses-
testing research is emphasized.  
In this research the policy position of cabinet Rutte I during the negotiations in the EU 
about a second bailout program for Greece (in 2012) and the policy position of cabinet Rutte 
II during the negotiations in the EU about the third bailout program for Greece (in 2015) will 
be analyzed. Because the goal of a case study is to ‘’generate as many testable implications of 
one’s hypotheses as possible in a given case’’ (Levy, 2008, p. 3), this research attempts to use 
different hypotheses trying to explain the government’s foreign policy position and the 
change of the (Dutch) government’s policy position. The goal of this research is therefore 
both to generate hypothesis and test hypothesis concerned the empirical relationship between 
a government’s foreign policy position and the independent variables as described in the 
theoretical framework.  
It is interesting to compare the cabinets Rutte I and Rutte II  as they have very, very 
different characteristics, which is the reason I choose these two cases. At first sight you will 
probably notice that the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) is presented in 
both governments and have the same prime-minister, Mark Rutte. But that is probably pretty 
much everything that these two cabinets have in common. The differences are striking, for 
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example Rutte I is a minority cabinet, while Rutte II is a majoritarian one. Meanwhile, Rutte I 
is a right-wing, conservative government, while Rutte II is a so-called ‘’purple’’ cabinet, 
consisting of a right-wing (VVD) and a left-wing party (Labour Party (PvdA)). It is therefore 
interesting to see what effect these big differences between those two governments have on 
the foreign policy position of the government and foreign policy-decision making. These 
differences make these cases so interesting to study as it could give valuable insight in the 
variables in play when foreign policy changes or not, and how a nation’s foreign policy 
position is affected by a different government, or how it remains the same. 
For this study both primary and secondary sources will be used as data resources. The 
collected sources are mostly selected from the period 2010-2015. Among the primary sources 
are official documents of debates in parliament, interviews with politicians, the programs of 
political parties. Secondary sources includes literature about political parties and their policy 
position regarding the EU and the internal dynamics of the Dutch cabinets. 
 
Empirical analysis 
 
The general Dutch policy position (both of Rutte I and Rutte II) regarding the EU is 
characterized by an Europragmatic position, which means that the government only is in favor 
of EU integration and/or cooperation on a specific policy field when the national state benefits 
of the EU integration/cooperation (Vollaard e.a., 2015, pp. 102-114). The biggest difference 
in the positions of Rutte I and Rutte II can be found in their rhetoric, as Rutte I is a lot more 
critical of the EU than Rutte II (compare for example both coalition formation agreements: 
Vrijheid en verantwoordelijkheid, 2010; Bruggen slaan, 2012). Regarding the European debt 
crisis and specifically the Greek government-debt crisis the Dutch government’s position 
(both of Rutte I and Rutte II) is characterized by a strict policy position regarding financial 
help for other EU-member states. This resulted in a policy position in which the Dutch 
government only would agree with an EU bailout packages if Greece would adopt severe 
austerity packages, abide to budgetary compliance and big structural reforms.  
To be more specific, among the shared policy position of the two cabinets was their 
refusal to agree with any hard restructuring of the Greek debt (i.e. cancel debt), although soft 
restructuring was negotiable, meaning that Greece was allowed to pay back its debts later and 
was allowed to pay temporarily no interest (AO 14 juli 2011; AO 16 julie 2015). A 
fundamental condition for the bailout in both government’s policy position was that the 
bailout should be credible. For the Greece citizens, the private sector (bank and others), and 
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other EU-member states (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 16 February 2012; Tweede 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 6 July 2015). Another shared policy position was the demand for 
more privatization of Greece’s state-owned corporations, like airports and harbors (Tweede 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 14 July 2011; Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal,16 July 2015).  
In 2011, when the crisis in Greece got worse, the EU and Greek Government finally 
agreed on a bailout in February 2012. During the negotiations the Dutch government argued it 
would only agree with a second bailout program for Greece if the next several requirements 
were met (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal,16 February 2012). The first requirement 
concerns the necessity of broad political support for the program, in Europe and Greece. 
Without this broad support the Dutch government would not agree with the bailout. The 
second condition/requirement is regarding the monitoring and compliance of the measures 
agreed upon in the second bailout program, to make sure Greece realizes its goals. In the past 
monitoring and compliance had been forsaken, and therefore the Dutch government only will 
agree with a second bailout if monitoring and compliance will improve. The third requirement 
is regarding the prior actions. These measures (like austerity packages, structural reforms, 
privatization) have to be in place before the Dutch government will agree with a second 
bailout program. The IMF joins this policy position as well; they will neither provide loans if 
Greece has not conducted these prior actions (see for a complete overview of the prior actions 
European Commission, 2012). The fourth requirement concerns the sustainability of the 
Greek debt. The Greek debt is not allowed to increase above 125% of the GDP. Another 
condition necessary the Dutch government sets for a second bailout program for Greece is 
Privat Sector Involvement (PSI). This was a very unpopular requirement in the EU, but the 
Dutch government hold onto it and was able to get it included in the bailout program. The last 
condition set by the Dutch government is that the IMF also provides new loans and joins the 
(current) attempt (in February 2012) to save Greece and prevent Greek bankruptcy. 
During the negotiations of the third bailout program for Greece in the summer of 2015 
the Dutch government’s policy position did not fundamentally change, as mentioned earlier. 
Although because of developments in Greece a few conditions previously set (in February 
2012) changed. Among the most notable changes in the policy position of the Dutch 
government was the requirement that the IMF would provide loans as well to Greece. For 
cabinet Rutte II this was not a necessary condition anymore to agree with a third bailout for 
Greece (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal,19 August 2015). Whereas cabinet Rutte I 
required the Greek government’s debt not to increase above 125%, it was impossible to hold 
onto this in  reality. Rutte II therefore took another approach and set as a condition that not 
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more of 15% of the Greek GDP should be spent on debt (interest + debt repayments)(Tweede 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 16 July 2015). Of course among the prior actions the Greek 
government has to take before the EU would provide new loans changed and were updated. In 
relation to the prior actions Rutte II emphasized that the Greek government should privatize 
more state-owned companies, like the airport of Athene and harbor of Piraeus, and reform 
retirement legislation, labor market and decrease the minimum wage (Tweede Kamer der 
Staten-Generaal, 6 July 2015; Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal,16 July 2015) . 
Before testing the hypothesis it is important to note that during Rutte I the cabinet 
could not depend on support of the PVV for their European agenda, as any policy regarding 
the EU was not agreed upon in the support agreement between VVD, CDA and PVV. To be 
more precise, the support agreement did not contain any policy agreement regarding any EU 
policy in general, or the European debt crisis specific. Therefore the cabinet was dependent on 
other parties in parliament for support for their policy regarding the European debt crisis, 
since the PVV was and is very critical of the EU. In 2012 even advocating that the 
Netherlands should leave the Eurozone as well as proposing a ‘Nexit’. The PVV would 
therefore never support the Dutch government’s policy agreeing with a bailout package for 
Greece or any other further EU integration. Usually the PvdA would help out the cabinet in 
this period, and therefore we will take also the PvdA into account during the empirical 
analysis of cabinet Rutte I, although they are not part of the official coalition. However, this 
does not mean I will not look at the PVV in my analysis, because they did support the EU 
policy of the cabinet, be it indirectly. If PVV was really opposed to the policy of the cabinet 
regarding the EU debt crisis, it could have let the government collapse. It did not and thereby 
implicitly supported the Dutch cabinet and allowed it to carry out its own policy.  
First it was hypothesized that ‘’the closer the parties are ideological, the more stable 
and consistent the government’s foreign policy’’. During Rutte I the support of CDA, VVD 
and PvdA was necessary to pass the second bailout program in Dutch parliament (on February 
28, 2012), while the implicit support of the PVV was necessary as well, as mentioned above 
(Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 28 January 2012). CDA and VVD are relatively close in 
their ideology regarding the European Union and the bailout program for Greece in February 
2012. CDA and VVD were mainly concerned with agreeing on a bailout package that was 
strict and hard for Greece, but at the same time credible. During the European debt crisis the 
cabinet could depend on support of PvdA for their policies, although PvdA usually thought 
the policies of the government did not go far enough. PvdA would have preferred that the EU 
did more to help Greece than is agreed upon in the concept agreements, although in the end 
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they did end up supporting the government (Tweede Kamer, 15 december 2011; Tweede 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 28 January 2012). Besides, PvdA’s argument for financial 
support is based on solidarity with other nations instead of being necessary for the Dutch 
national interest (which is the main argument for VVD and CDA to agree with the 
bailout(s))(Vollaard e.a., 2015, pp. 128-138).  
Fundamentally CDA, VVD and PvdA understand that European cooperation and 
integration has become unavoidable and necessary in the European debt crisis (Vollaard e.a., 
2015, pp. 99-182). The PVV is the most anti-EU party in the Netherlands. In the period 2010-
2012 party leader Geert Wilders for example stated that no (tax)money of the Dutch citizens 
should go to Southern European countries, these countries betrayed the Netherlands and are 
using mafia-practices to blackmail the Netherlands to save the Greek banks (Tweede Kamer 
der Staten-Generaal, 5 July 2012). In the period of 2010-2015 the position of the VVD and 
PvdA did not change fundamentally, both parties opposed policy proposals like Eurobonds, a 
transfer union and the forgiving of Greek debt. 
Although during cabinet Rutte I an informal coalition was necessary to approve the 
second bailout of Greece in the Dutch parliament the government’s remained both stable and 
consistent, as perceived in the period of August 2011 till the end of February 2012. The same 
can be said of the policy position of the Dutch government during the negotiations of the third 
bailout program in 2015. Especially the case of the Dutch policy position during the second 
bailout program indicates that the ideological composition does not impact the stability and 
consistency of a government’s policy position. Compared to the Dutch policy position during 
the third bailout of Greece in 2015 there was little difference in the stability and consistency 
in the two cabinets policy positions. Therefore there is no support for the first hypothesis. 
Secondly I hypothesized that ‘’a task orientation of a leader that is focused on the 
national and/or his/her party’s policy position will lead to a more confrontational policy 
position’’. First I will take a look at prime-minister Rutte’s leadership, but because the 
ministers of finance arguably had a bigger role than Rutte in the negotiations on EU level and 
in exercising the Dutch policy position regarding the European debt crisis I will also take a 
look at their role and perception of their own task and goal later on. During the negotiations of 
the second bailout of Greece in 2012 Rutte was able to influence the negotiations on EU-level 
so compromises could be made and an agreement was reached (Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal, 15 december 2010). A second example of Rutte’s leadership manifested itself 
during the negotiations of the third bailout program for Greece in 201.  Rutte did take a 
different position than his own party, as the VVD found it very difficult to agree with the deal 
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Rutte negotiated in the EU. While his party was critical of the deal, Rutte himself defended 
the measures. He could have said this deal was all he could negotiate in the EU, but he did 
not. He defended the bailout program, arguing that it was beneficial and necessary for the 
Netherlands and Europe (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 19 August 2015). 
During cabinet Rutte I CDA delivered the finance minister; De Jager, who became 
known in the Eurogroup as someone with, rigorous views on financial support and 
confrontational negotiation style (De Waal, 2011; De Jager wil best ‘immens impopulair’ zijn, 
2011). In the Eurogroup he fiercely defended and championed the Dutch interests. Based on 
interviews with De Jager and media reports it becomes clear De Jager sees it as his task to 
keep the other EU member states to the agreements reached in the EU and to make sure 
budgetary rules are not violated (De Waal, 2011; De Jager wil best ‘immens impopulair’ zijn, 
2011). There is no specific data on De Jager’s leadership during the EU negotiations of the 
second Greek bailout. But based on the impression given above of De Jager it seems likely 
that De Jager was not very tactful in his negotiation strategy and did not shy away from 
conflict with his colleagues in the Eurogroup. 
Dijsselbloem (PvdA) was the minister of Finance during Rutte II. His views on his 
task and goal were a little bit different than De Jager’s. Although he is maybe as strict and 
rigorous as De Jager, he is not concerned with his party’s ideology and/or policy positions and 
prefers and sees it as his task to ‘solve’ the problem. Sometimes this even results in critical 
remarks on his own party’s policy position during the European debt crisis (Broer & 
Oberndorff, 2013; Schmidt, 2014). In the past this has led to critique on his position by his 
own party members. But also Dutch members of parliament have criticized Dijsselbloem. 
During the debt crisis Dijsselbloem has been accused that he does not represent the Dutch 
interest in the Eurogroup well enough by Dutch politicians who think he is too busy with his 
role as Eurogroup chairman representing the EU-interest (Broer & Oberndorff, 2013). 
I hypothesized that a national or partisan position of the leader would lead to a more 
confrontational, harder policy position of the Dutch government in the EU during the 
negotiations for the second and third bailout for Greece. However, despite the Dutch strict and 
rigorous views and policy position in these negotiations, both Rutte and Dijsselbloem do not 
seem to have a task/goal orientation that is focused on the national or partisan interest. Both 
seemed more concerned with mediating in order to obtain concessions (of other countries 
during the negotiations) and an agreement. Although it seems the case and task orientation of 
De Jager in relation to the Dutch policy position in the EU negotiations confirm the second 
hypothesis, it is clear that the results are mixed and most evidence does not support this 
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hypothesis. Although it was theorized that the leader(s) would mainly represent the national 
and partisan interest, this analysis shows a different representation of reality in which it is not 
so obvious that politicians are only/mainly concerned with their national or partisan interest. 
The last hypothesis stated that ‘’ more parties in a coalition will lead to more 
constraints and therefore less agency of the government’’.  Since Cabinet Rutte I was 
characterized by the uncommon situation of a minority government. As noted earlier, this 
meant that the government’s policy regarding the European debt crisis could not depend on 
support from PVV and therefore the government had to gather support for their European 
policies in parliament; the government was always dependent on the opposition parties in 
parliament for support. During the negotiations of the second bailout program for Greece 
cabinet Rutte I was dependent on the support of CDA, VVD and PvdA and implicit support of 
the PVV. So during the negotiations for the second bailout of Greece in 2012 four parties 
were involved in the negotiations on the national level. Therefore the coalition parties, CDA, 
VVD had to keep an eye on the interests of the cooperating opposition party, PvdA, as well as 
the interest of PVV in order not to alienate them too much and thus giving them any reason to 
(make threats to) dissolve the government. 
Negotiations with these parties resulted in no fundamental change of policy. However, 
the PvdA and PVV both had their demands. For example Rutte promised parliament that they 
could vote about financial support for banks, and therefore can make demands, otherwise 
PvdA support would have been impossible  (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 5 July 
2012). A second example is on 28 February 2012, when the parliament agreed with the EU 
decision for the second bailout program for Greece. Besides CDA and VVD the PvdA 
supported this program, since they had voiced their conditions for support earlier. In 
anticipation of the second bailout of Greece of February 2012 parliament came already back 
from their summer recess for an emergency meeting in June 2011 during the negotiations of 
the second bailout program, while the only thing on the table was a concept agreement. At the 
same meeting PvdA demanded the private financial sector would contribute to the financial 
support packages for Greece as well (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 14 June 2011). The 
Dutch government indeed changed its policy position on this topic in Europe and finance 
minister De Jager argued in favor of private sector contributions a month later in the 
Eurogroup, and as mentioned above earlier, this so-called PSI became part of the second 
bailout (Hinke, 2011; European Commission, 2012). The demands of the PVV were focused 
on national politics, as they promised that if additional budgetary cuts in the Netherland were 
necessary because of the financial support for Greece the PVV would withdraw their support 
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in parliament for cabinet Rutte I, effectively dissolving the cabinet (Tweede Kamer, 19 May 
2011).  
During the cabinet of Rutte II the negotiations with parliament were a lot easier for the 
government, as this was a majority government, consisting of the parties VVD and PvdA. The 
Dutch parliament had much less influence on the negotiations of third bailout program than 
on the second bailout program in 2012. Even the coalition parties had less influence, since 
Rutte I was characterized by a phenomenal cooperation and consultation between (the leaders 
of) the two coalition parties, resulting in the first Dutch cabinet to complete its term in 18 
years (Niemantsverdriet e.a., 2016). The leaders of the coalition (Rutte, Zijlstra (both VVD), 
Asscher and Samson (PvdA)) had an informal meeting every Monday (and when necessary 
other ministers joined them) to discuss the most important matters. This resulted in less 
conflict in the coalition and increased understanding for each other’s position and problems. 
For example, during the negotiations for the third bailout program for Greece the VVD found 
it very difficult to support these measures. The VDD’s members of parliament only accepted 
the deal after five hours of discussing it because they did not want to isolate the Netherlands 
in the EU, neither did they have the illusion their refusal could change anything (VVD zegt 
met tegenzin ‘ja’ tegen Griekse steun, 2011). Important here is that the (leaders of the) PvdA 
kept their distance and did not pressure the VVD, so the VVD’s leaders could secure their 
own party’s support (Niemantsverdriet e.a., 2016). 
To conclude, it becomes clear that during Rutte I the government was severely 
constrained by its position in parliament, resulting in the cooperation with several opposition 
parties. While it did not harm the government’s position to make policy regarding the second 
bailout of Greece or other policies regarding the European debt crisis because decision-
making and negotiations in the EU took so long, policy making became increasingly difficult 
to do so. So although the government was highly constrained in parliament and many parties 
were involved, it did not result in less agency, which means the case of Rutte I does not 
support the hypothesis. Looking at the case of Rutte II a different view becomes clear. In the 
theoretical framework it was hypothesized that high-level coalition committees would pose as 
an extra constraint for coalitions, resulting in less agency. However the opposite seems true in 
this case, as the informal meetings of Rutte II resulted in more cooperation and more 
government agency. Of course, as was mentioned already above, although this high level 
cooperation between the leaders of PvdA and VVD is not common in governments, it shows 
that such high-level coalition committees do not necessarily pose a constraint on foreign 
policy decision-making. 
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It seems therefore that the amount of parties in a coalition necessary for a policy does 
not result in less government agency. During the negotiations of the second bailout program 
the policy making of the government was more difficult, because the support of more parties 
was necessary. While this was an extra constraint, it did not lead to less agency of the 
government. During the negotiations of the third bailout program for Greece it became 
obvious that one of the hypothesized constraints actually did not negatively affect the 
government’s ability to make foreign policy, but increased (in this specific case). There is 
therefore no support for the third hypothesis. 
 
Conclusion & discussion 
 
Summarizing, there seems little evidence and support for the first hypothesis regarding the 
influence of the ideological composition of a coalition on the cabinet’s foreign policy 
decision-making. This seems to support the scholars who have argued ideology composition 
is indeed not important in explaining a coalition government’s foreign policy decision-
making. As Oktay (2014) argued two key characteristics were disregarded, although these 
characteristics were fundamental (according to Oktay) in explaining the mixed results of the 
debate. Taking my results into account it seems one of these key characteristics, ideological 
composition, does not increase the weak understanding of the relationship between 
government composition and foreign policy behavior. This indicates that future explanations 
should be sought in the other key characteristic Oktay addresses; the type of coalition and its 
corresponding characteristics. 
The results of the analysis of the second hypothesis show, as mentioned earlier, mixed 
results. While all leaders of finance in general refrained of looking after their own party’s 
interest, or even sometimes criticizing their own party, like Dijsselbloem did,  it is 
questionable if party controlling the ministry of foreign affairs really has more influence on 
foreign policy (decision-making). It became obvious leaders mainly represent the national 
interest or even look after the interest of the international community. This indicates that it 
does not really matter which party controls the ministry of foreign affairs in a setting in which 
the locus of authority is the cabinet as a whole, as is the case in Dutch politics. Besides, there 
is no evidence that  the parties of the ministers of finance (in this case, but usually the 
ministers of foreign affairs) have a strong incentive to expose itself to the public, like 
Oppermann e.a. (2016) suggested.  
19 
 
One reason is maybe case-specific. Maybe because in these two cases the issues at 
stake (a second and third Greek bailout) were perceived as ‘negative’. Telling the Dutch 
citizens their tax-money goes to Greece is difficult to frame as something positive, even if it 
shows your decisiveness as a party (and therefore something that should be seen positive) like 
Oppermann e.a. argued. Another possible explanation is theoretical. Especially the leadership 
of Rutte and Dijsselbloem indicates that a leader in a government does not perceive 
him/herself as a member of a party in the first place, but as a member of the 
government/cabinet or when they represent their country on the international stage as a 
member of international community. This could result in decreased priority of partisan or 
even national interests as the leader perceives he has a different role as government official. 
This result seems to support Kaarbo’s (2008) suspicion that the social psychological dynamics 
of small groups might be an possible explanation for a government’s policy position. Not only 
in a coalition, but also on the policy position of a government in negotiations in an 
International Organization.  
Finally, this research showed that the interaction of constraints (as a result of the 
amount of parties in a coalition) is not as straightforward is as sometimes thought. The 
constraints analyzed in this research both had a different effect than expected. Although in the 
case of negotiations of the second bailout program in 2012 a combination of more than 
enough time to negotiate on a national level and especially the position of the PvdA and PVV 
led to the result in which the agency of the government was not really affected. This also 
indicates that future explanations in variation of coalition foreign policy behavior should be 
sought in the type of coalition and specific characteristics of that type, as earlier suggested. 
The PVV supported the coalition of CDA and VVD, the only coalition they could possible 
participate in because of their right-wing status in parliament. Dissolving the coalition meant 
losing their only chance of real influence and leverage on the cabinet. At the same time the 
PvdA was not very difficult to persuade to agree with the second bailout for Greece, because 
of its policy position regarding financial help for other EU-member states. 
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